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I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe, the mobile communications revolution is well under 
way. From advanced economies such as the United States, to developing 
economies like India, mobile telecommunications, in both voice and data 
forms, is quickly becoming the communications technology of choice. In 
the United States, it took less than fifteen years for wireless telephones to 
move from a thinly consumed service to effective ubiquity.1 In 2009, there 
were 285.6 million wireless accounts in the United States, which translates 
to roughly 1.1 accounts for every person over ten years of age or more.2 
Mobile communications has evolved well beyond voice technology to now 
include enhanced communications services such as text messages, e-mail, 
and broadband connectivity, which are, in fact, quickly becoming the 
dominant source of consumer value for mobile service. In the not-so-distant 
future, it is expected by some that mobile appliances, like the iPhone, will 
replace traditional computers for many consumers.3 For many individuals 
and households, mobile broadband may be the Internet connection of 
choice.4 
This rise in wireless connections, as well as the rapidly increasing 
demand for data services over such connections, is a mixed blessing. On 
the one hand, it provides an enormous economic boon to consumers, 
businesses, and providers; on the other hand, however, it is beginning to 
test the capacity of networks to provide such services. As a result, the 
supply of available quality commercial spectrum is rapidly becoming 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See CTIA, Background on CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, at 3–4 
(2011), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Year_End_2010_Graphics.pdf (showing 33.7 
million accounts in 1995 (0.13 per capita) and 292.8 million in 2010 (0.95 per capita)).   
 2. Id.; Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2009-sa.html (268.5 million persons 
ten years and over). 
 3. See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Time to Leave the Laptop Behind, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2009, at R1; Geoff Kirbyson, More of Us Cutting the Cord: Wireless Generation 
Unplugging Their Computers, Phones, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Aug. 20, 2010, at A2; Bill 
Ray, Cutting the Cord: Future Mobile Broadband Tech, REGISTER HARDWARE (July 14, 
2009), http://www.reghardware.com/2009/07/14/future_wireless_tech/. 
 4. See, e.g., Wingfield, supra note 3. 
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exhausted.5  
Fortunately, this fact has not gone unrecognized by policymakers. 
FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski recently observed that “America is 
facing a looming spectrum crunch”6 because “the United States does not 
have nearly enough spectrum to meet its medium- and long-term mobile 
broadband needs.”7 Perhaps the single most important proposal in the 
National Broadband Plan is to make 500 megahertz (MHz) of additional 
spectrum available by 2020 for the provision of mobile broadband services, 
with ideally 300 MHz of that spectrum being made available by 2015,8 a 
vision that President Obama formally endorsed by Presidential 
Memorandum.9 
Allocating more spectrum to advanced mobile services (such as 
broadband) is widely viewed as a sensible, if not a necessary, public 
policy.10 However, merely stating that more spectrum is to be allocated to 
commercial mobile services leaves some highly relevant details unresolved. 
There are (at least) two important questions that must be answered when 
increasing the supply of spectrum: (1) how much new spectrum is to be 
allocated; and, more importantly, (2) who gets it?11 On the first question, as 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Within limits, the capacity of fixed amount of spectrum can also be enhanced by 
increasing the number of towers. FCC, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 77 (2010), 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (describing the capacity 
limitation of mobile broadband network); FCC, THE BROADBAND AVAILABILITY GAP 71 
(2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/the-broadband-availability-gap-obi-technical-
paper-no-1.pdf (“Loosely speaking, if spectral efficiency of the air interface remains 
unchanged, capacity of the wireless network grows proportionately with spectrum 
allocation.”); see also FCC, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 
(2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadband-
benefits-of-additional-spectrum.pdf. 
 6. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Mobile Broadband: A 21st Century Plan for 
the U.S. Competitiveness, Innovation and Job Creation, Prepared Remarks at the New 
America Foundation (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296490A1.pdf. 
 7. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Broadband: Our Enduring Engine for 
Prosperity and Opportunity, Prepared Remarks at the NARUC Conference, Washington, 
D.C. (Feb. 16, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
296262A1.pdf. 
 8. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 10. 
 9. See Lawrence H. Summers, Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council, Technological Opportunities, 
Job Creation, and Economic Growth, Remarks at the New America Foundation on the 
President’s Spectrum Initiative (June 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/speeches/technological-opportunities-
job-creation-economic-growth. 
 10. See id.; NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5; Genachowski, supra 
note 6. 
 11. There are, of course, many more important questions, such as how large are the 
blocks, are they licensed or unlicensed, are they auctioned, what is the geographic scope of 
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noted a moment ago, the FCC has proposed to increase substantially the 
spectrum available for mobile services. On the other hand, the FCC has 
sent clear signals that it is concerned with increasing industry concentration 
(despite the fact that it approved every auction and wireless merger to date) 
and, by implication, that it would prefer to allocate any new spectrum 
primarily to new entrants and possibly smaller incumbents, rather than the 
largest incumbent providers, in order to “deconcentrate” the industry.12   
The allocation of spectrum among firms is a complex issue for which 
economic theory can provide key insights. To this end, we provide in this 
Article a theoretical analysis of some of the relevant tradeoffs involved in 
allocating spectrum among service providers. Informally, our analysis 
contemplates two (theoretical) states of the world. In the first, a fixed 
amount of spectrum is divided among many firms so that each firm has a 
“little” spectrum. In the other, that same fixed amount of spectrum is 
divided among fewer firms, so that each firm has “much” spectrum. 
Incorporating the modeling assumption that a firm with a larger holding of 
spectrum can provide more advanced services due to greater capacity and 
throughput than a firm with less spectrum,13 the theoretical tradeoff, all 
other things constant, is straightforward. In a setting with “many firms with 
little spectrum,” there may be more price competition, but that competition 
takes place over relatively less advanced services.14 In a setting with fewer 
firms with larger allotments of spectrum, there may be less price 
competition (due to the Cournot assumption), but that competition occurs 
over more advanced services (due to the relationship between spectrum and 
the capacity to offer such services). Lower prices are good, and higher 
quality is good, but, if quality requires large amounts of a fixed allotment 
of spectrum, then the two may not occur together (as a result of the 
                                                                                                                 
the license, and so forth. 
 12. See infra Part II. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of industry concentration falls as 
market share shifts from larger to smaller firms.  
 13. The form of the holdings is a significant factor. For example, having spectrum in 
paired bands permits greater bandwidth. See, e.g., BROADBAND AVAILABILITY GAP, supra 
note 5, at 73. On the tradeoff between expanding capacity using more spectrum or deploying 
more network, see, for example, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL 
SPECTRUM, supra note 5. 
 14. In the Cournot setting, firms choose the quantities they will offer to the market, and 
then the market price is determined by the market that liquidates those quantities. (Such a 
setting is akin to firms that set sales targets.) With Cournot competition, price and profits 
fall as the number of firms increases, converging on the competitive equilibrium. This 
“more firms, lower price” mentality dominates regulatory debates, and it is reasonable to 
say that Cournot competition is the benchmark in regulatory settings. See STEPHEN MARTIN, 
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 17–35 (1993); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. 
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 157–87 (2000).  
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modeling assumptions). Consequently, the policymaker is asked to trade 
off between potentially lower prices for less advanced services, and 
potentially higher prices for more advanced services. It is not apparent, at 
first glance, which situation is “better.”   
Since, however, either of the above-described outcomes can be 
supported as “best” under certain conditions, linking the theory to the 
current structure of the mobile telecommunications industry is required in 
order to render policy-relevant conclusions. We believe this linkage, 
properly understood, can render fairly strong prescriptions. First, while 
additional firms can lead to lower prices (at least in the Cournot 
competition framework, which is the standard for regulatory policy), at 
some point additional firms have almost no effect on price. In fact, 
economic theory suggests that the price cuts resulting from additional firms 
rapidly diminish, and there is evidence to support this theoretical result.15 
Price cuts are mostly exhausted after about three to five rivals are present in 
the market.16 From an empirical standpoint, FCC data indicate that at 
present about ninety-one percent of the population has access to four or 
more mobile providers.17 Consequently, adding new competitors to the 
mobile industry is expected to have a small impact on prices. The gains 
from dividing spectrum into smaller parts in an effort to create more firms 
(e.g., using spectrum caps) are therefore likely to be very low, even under 
favorable conditions.18 Alternately, the economic gains from having access 
to broadband services are typically viewed as being very large, so a policy 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck & Sheila Mozejko, Concentration and Price/Cost Margins 
Across Time in Canada, 9 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. SCI. 40, 40 (1992); Stephen A. Rhoades, 
Market Share as a Source of Market Power: Implications and Some Evidence, 37 J. ECON. 
& BUS. 343, 343 (1985); Michael Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship 
Reconsidered in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 287 (1990); 
John R. Schroeter, Estimating the Degree of Market Power in the Beef Packing Industry, 70 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 158, 158 (1988); Myron B. Slovin et al., Deregulation, Contestability, 
and Airline Acquisitions, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231 (1991); Gary Whalen, The Determinants 
and Performance Effects of Rivalry in Local Banking Markets, 31 Q. J. BUS. & ECON. 38, 38 
(1992).  
 16. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 14, at 165. (“The effect of additional rivals on 
quantity and price is initially very strong, but tapers off as the number of firms increases.”). 
 17. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 44 (2010) [hereinafter Fourteenth CMRS 
Report]. 
 18. The Merger Guidelines, for example, recommend ignoring mergers where the HHI 
is 1800 or less, which is equivalent to five equal-sized firms. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. Thus, the fifth firm is viewed as 
trivial in terms of its effect on equilibrium prices.  
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of granting existing firms (which can maximize spillovers from their 
existing plant and customer relationships) sufficient spectrum to run 
scalable networks that support innovation in both applications and devices 
is likely to produce substantial economic benefits. Therefore, in effect we 
have a situation where price changes are no longer a part of the calculus, 
since adding firms is expected to have a small effect on price competition. 
As such, the tradeoff revealed by the theory is simply between less- or 
more-advanced services, and the best policy is clear. 
In large part, our analysis comports with the recommendations of the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which address not simply the issue of 
how much spectrum should be allocated to the industry, but the importance 
of how much spectrum is given to a single firm. In a letter to the FCC, the 
DOJ observes, “[s]tated simply, without access to sufficient spectrum a 
firm cannot provide state-of-the-art wireless broadband services.”19 The 
DOJ also addresses, to some extent, the details of allocation decisions, 
observing, “[t]he goal in assigning licenses to any such new spectrum 
designated for commercial services should be to ensure that it generates the 
greatest ultimate benefits to the consumers of those services.”20 Our 
economic model adopts this “greatest ultimate benefits” approach, which is 
standard economic fare. 
Another important insight from the theory is that policymakers do not 
get to choose the number of firms offering mobile telecommunications 
services simply through the government’s spectrum allocation decisions. 
Stated another way, the conventional wisdom that “more” spectrum 
somehow a fortiori means “more” firms simply is not true.21 As explained 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Notice of Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department of Justice at 22, 
Economic Issues in Broadband Competition; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, 
FCC GN Docket No. 09-51 (rel. Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020355122.  
 20. Id. at 23. 
 21. Cf. Mignon Clyburn, Comm’r, FCC, Introduction to the Panel “Wireless Spectrum 
Needs: What Is the Best Way to Serve All of the American People?,” Prepared Remarks at 
the Rainbow Push Coalition 39th Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois 3 (June 14, 2010), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-298781A1.pdf (“[A]dditional 
spectrum could foster more competition in the wireless space, which in turn could yield 
more affordable prices.”); Gregory L. Rosston, Deputy Dir. & Senior Research Scholar, 
Stanford Inst. for Economic Policy, Research Deputy Dir., Public Policy Program Stanford 
University, FCC En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices, Stanford 
University 7 (Apr. 17, 2008) (“Obviously, it would be great if it were economic for multiple 
firms to string fiber optic cable around all neighborhoods in the United States. That is 
unlikely to happen. But the FCC has tools to make facilities-based competition more likely 
and more viable. First and foremost, the FCC should get even more spectrum out into the 
marketplace. And it is probably important that the spectrum not continue to go into the 
hands of the two incumbent landline telephone companies that also have by far the most 
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in Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and 
Convergence,22 which was cited at length by the FCC in the Fourteenth 
CMRS Report, it is the supply- and demand-side economic conditions of 
the marketplace that determine the equilibrium number of firms.23 
Economics determines the viable number of providers, not the intentions of 
policymakers.24 Mobile services cannot be supplied without spectrum, but 
having spectrum does not imply financial success. Spectrum is simply one 
input to production and cannot singularly determine the financial viability 
of firms offering mobile communications services. This is apparent from 
the history of the mobile industry, which has undergone consolidation over 
much of its history (and may be due for more).25 This consolidation is 
merely the industry adjusting towards a sustainable structure—an 
equilibrium consisting of fewer firms than that licensed by the design of the 
early FCC spectrum allocation decisions. The reality is that, while we may 
want five, ten, or twenty mobile telephony service providers, the economics 
are unlikely to permit it.26 Consequently, the heavy use of incumbent-
exclusion policies (such as spectrum caps or other limitations on spectrum 
use by firms) may not result in more providers, but may instead lead simply 
to inefficient use of scarce spectrum resources.27 
                                                                                                                 
valuable wireless spectrum.”).  
 22. George S. Ford et al., Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure, and 
Convergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (2007).  
 23. Id.; see Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 56–57; see also 
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 36–37; Implementation of Section 19 of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 
F.C.C.R. 7442, app. H (1994) (discussing how the presence of high sunk costs may have a 
decisive effect on the evolution of local market structure and the possible trade-offs between 
the number of actual competitors in any local cable market and the intensity of price 
competition that might prevail) [hereinafter First Report].  
 24. See Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 341–44 (explaining that the 
equilibrium number of firms is expressed as a function of market size in expenditures, the 
intensity of competition, and the sunk cost of entry).  
 25. Marguerite Reardon, Sprint CEO Sees ‘Logic’ in Merger with T-Mobile, CNET 
NEWS (July 13, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20010427-266.html; Andrew 
Parker & Paul Taylor, Sprint’s 4G Move Opens Way to Merger, FT.COM (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4d6eb6a-8de0-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html. 
 26. See Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 61 n.141 (citing An 
Examination of Competition in the Wireless Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th 
Cong. 5 (2009) (written statement of George S. Ford, Chief Economist, Phoenix Center for 
Advanced Legal & Economic Public Studies)). 
 27. Cf. Clyburn, supra note 21, at 5 (“As we roll out more spectrum to auction across 
the board, what role will minority businesses play? I recently expressed my dismay over 
conflicting signals that are given out by the FCC and DOJ as to what kinds of bidders the 
federal government is seeking when it comes to conditions on spectrum reallocation. The 
concern is what happens to the spectrum that is being auctioned. Are we going to continue 
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Finally, we present empirical evidence shedding light on the 
relationship between industry concentration and the amount of spectrum 
licensed for commercial services. While many believe and claim that more 
spectrum will necessarily lead to more competitors, this causal linkage has 
no basis in either theory (as just discussed) or empirics. While the PCS 
auctions in the mid-1990s broke the then (government-created) duopolistic 
market, over the past decade the amount of spectrum allocated to 
commercial services has risen substantially; at the same time, however, 
industry concentration has risen slightly as mobile communications 
advances toward an equilibrium market structure.28 Recent data show that 
more spectrum does not generally lead to lower industry concentration (see 
figure 4 infra). In many respects, this finding should not be a surprise. As 
services advance, so do the sunk costs of building and maintaining the 
networks and, equally important, the costs of building and maintaining a 
customer base. In turn, equilibrium industry concentration rises. This 
consequence of quality competition is explained theoretically in John 
Sutton’s text, Sunk Costs and Market Structure, and the logic of these 
“endogenous” sunk costs is embedded in recent FCC analysis.29 
Fortunately, research shows that higher concentration arising from the 
endogenous sunk costs resulting from quality competition can have positive 
welfare consequences.30 The data also show that rising concentration has 
not been accompanied by rising prices (see figure 4 infra).31 Average 
revenue per minute has fallen significantly and persistently over the past 
fifteen years, suggesting that market structure may not be a meaningful 
driver of price competition at historically relevant levels of industry 
concentration.32 
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, we provide an overview 
of the FCC’s treatment of concentration in the wireless industry—from the 
imposition of spectrum caps in the mid 1990s, to the abolition of these 
                                                                                                                 
to see spectrum go to the largest providers? Or are there meaningful opportunities to be had 
for small and underrepresented businesses in this high-growth field? This aspect of the 
spectrum conversation cannot be ignored.”).  
 28. See generally Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22 (describing equilibrium 
industry structure in plain language). 
 29. JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE (1991); NATIONAL 
BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 62 n.2 (“The key insight is that in such industries the 
total number of firms is likely to be limited and may even shrink as the market grows.”). 
 30. See George S. Ford & Michael Stern, Endogenous Sunk Costs, Quality Competition 
and Welfare: A Technical Note, PHOENIX CENTER PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 16, 2010, 
http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-07Final.pdf. 
 31. See Fourteenth CRMS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 52, 186, 190 (considering 
Table 8 on industry concentration and Tables 18 and 19 on prices). 
 32. See infra Figure 1. 
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spectrum caps in 2001, to the re-imposition of de facto spectrum caps in the 
Harbinger merger review proceeding.33 In Part III, we set forth an 
analytical framework to evaluate the important policy questions posited 
above. In Part IV, we deal specifically with the commonly held belief that 
“more spectrum” a fortiori means “more” firms. Concluding thoughts and 
policy recommendations are set forth in Part V. 
II. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO SPECTRUM CAPS 
Implications of industry concentration have always been a difficult 
issue for the FCC. The potential for concentration in the wireless sector is 
especially acute due to “the barrier to entry posed by the limited 
availability of spectrum.”34 As the FCC observed ten years ago in the 2000 
Biennial Review: 
The requirement to obtain access to spectrum constitutes a barrier to 
facilities-based entry into the CMRS marketplace because the supply 
of suitable spectrum is limited. Facilities-based mobile telephony 
service cannot be offered without access to suitable spectrum, and a 
government license is required to use spectrum to provide CMRS.35 
The FCC’s first attempt at dealing with industry concentration was the 
imposition of spectrum caps in anticipation of the auction of PCS spectrum 
in 1994.36 At the time, there were two firms offering mobile telephone 
services in each market, one of which was the incumbent wireline provider. 
The FCC essentially proffered two explanations for its decision. First, it 
was concerned that if licensees were able “to aggregate sufficient amounts 
of CMRS spectrum, then it would be possible for them, unilaterally or in 
combination, to exclude efficient competitors, to reduce the quantity or 
quality of services provided, or to increase prices to the detriment of 
consumers.”37 Second, the FCC reasoned that a spectrum cap would 
“prevent licensees from artificially withholding [(i.e., “warehousing”)] 
capacity from the marketplace.”38 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The purpose of a spectrum cap is to place an upper bound on the amount of 
spectrum available to mobile carriers, a rule that historically has been binding only for the 
larger carriers. The Harbinger rules restrict access by the largest wireless carriers to 
spectrum capacity in the secondary market, thereby operating in a similar capacity as a de 
jure spectrum cap. 
 34. 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial 
Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22668, para. 39 (2001) [hereinafter 
2000 Biennial Review]. 
 35. Id. at para. 40. 
 36. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Third 
Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7988 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 CMRS Spectrum Cap Order]. 
 37. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 12. 
 38. Id. 
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Seven years later, the wireless telephone market had undergone a 
competitive transformation as the PCS spectrum permitted additional entry. 
At the end of 2000, the FCC found that “about ninety-one percent of U.S. 
residents lived in a county that was served, at least in part, by three or more 
different . . . providers, and seventy-five percent of the U.S. population 
lived in a county where five or more providers offered service.”39 
Moreover, the FCC found that market concentration, as measured by 
subscriber share, was falling.40 On the other hand, it found that when it 
used spectrum share as the capacity measure, the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index (HHI) revealed “moderate” to “high” concentration.41   
Both supply-side and demand-side conditions in the mobile sector, 
including scale economies, tend to favor larger firms and thus promote 
relatively concentrated market outcomes. Building, maintaining, and 
operating a mobile communications business requires significant capital 
expenditures on both network infrastructure and customer relationships. 
Industry concentration, as measured by indexes such as the HHI, is likely 
to be relatively high for the foreseeable future (greater than, say, the 
thresholds commonly used in the Merger Guidelines for defining 
concentrated markets).42 But high concentration does not imply poor 
performance, and this point was not lost on the FCC. It reasoned that 
“caution is appropriate in employing such measures” as the HHI because 
[a]lthough more concentrated markets can be less competitive and 
more vulnerable to anticompetitive activity than less concentrated 
markets, moderate to high concentration is not necessarily a threat to 
competition. For example, we have previously found that “an HHI 
analysis alone is not determinative and does not substitute for our more 
detailed examination of competitive considerations.” In the case of 
CMRS markets, for example, limits to economies of scale, 
technological compatibility issues, difficulties in finding a willing 
seller at a reasonable price, and capital market constraints limit 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at para. 31. 
 40. Id. at para. 32. 
 41. Id. at para. 33. The HHI is an accepted measure of market concentration but has 
limitations in dynamic markets. The index is calculated by summing the squared market 
shares of each firm. For example, a market consisting of three equally sized firms has an 
HHI of 3,333 (= 1/3 = 33.3332 + 33.3332 + 33.3332). The number’s equivalent is simply 
[1/(HHI/1000)], where this ratio measures the number of hypothetical, equally sized firms in 
a market (irrespective of the actual distribution of market shares.  
 42. 1997 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18. The 1997 Merger 
Guidelines define as “highly concentrated” those markets with a HHI exceeding 1,800. In 
the proposed 2010 revisions to the Merger Guidelines, however, a “highly concentrated” 
market is one with an HHI exceeding 2,500. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (proposed Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/100420hmg.pdf. 
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consolidation.43 
Here, the FCC rejected an exclusive reliance on HHIs and instead pointed 
to its then-recent Sixth CMRS Report,44 which found that the wireless 
market was performing well. Not only was subscribership up, but also 
wireless prices were on the decline.45 Moreover, the FCC found that there 
were six nationwide wireless operators (AT&T, Cingular, Nextel, Sprint, 
Verizon, and VoiceStream) from which consumers could choose.46 Finally, 
the FCC found that “the need for direct access to spectrum is not absolute 
because carriers can compete in the provision of CMRS without direct 
access to spectrum through resale, or a mobile virtual network operator 
(‘MVNO’) arrangement.”47 
Given the above, the FCC held that it was persuaded that competition 
was robust enough in CMRS markets that it was no longer appropriate to 
impose overbroad, a priori limits on spectrum aggregation that may 
prevent transactions that are in the public interest. As such, as part of the 
FCC’s mandatory 2000 Biennial Review, the Commission eliminated the 
spectrum cap regime in favor of a more nuanced, case-by-case approach, 
accompanied by enforcement sanctions in case of misconduct. In so doing, 
the FCC reasoned that it now had the necessary “flexibility to reach the 
appropriate decision in each case, on the basis of the particular 
circumstances of that case.”48 
In the ten years that have followed the FCC’s removal of its original 
price caps, it has made new spectrum available to the market, most notably 
the 700 MHz and AWS spectrum made available from the DTV transition. 
At the same time, the FCC also approved several mergers and 
combinations of mobile licensees, thereby reducing the number of 
nationwide mobile carriers from six in 2000 to four in 2010.49 In its 
Fourteenth CMRS Report, the FCC found, by its own calculations, that 
between 2003 and 2008, average HHI had increased from 2151 to 2848—a 
                                                                                                                 
 43. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 33 (citation omitted) (citing 
WorldCom, Inc. & MCI Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 
18025, 18084 (1998)). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[r]eliance on statistical 
market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best a tricky enterprise and is 
downright folly where . . . the predominant market share is the result of regulation.” Metro 
Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Comm. Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 44. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350 (2001) [hereinafter Sixth CMRS Report]. 
 45. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 35. 
 46. Id. at para. 38. 
 47. Id. at para. 42 (citation omitted). 
 48. Id. at para. 50. 
 49. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 75–84. 
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rise of 697 points.50 Again, the FCC remarked that “market concentration, 
by itself, is an imperfect indicator of market power,” and deliberately 
reached no conclusions on market power.51 
The evidence speaks for itself, however. By the FCC’s own account, 
the wireless market in the United States continues to perform exceptionally 
well. According to the Fourteenth CMRS Report, mobile subscribership 
was up,52 and consumers were benefitting from aggressive price 
competition in both the prepaid and postpaid markets from a variety of 
pricing plans.53 Indeed, average revenues per voice minute continued to 
hover around $0.05,54 and average revenue per text message was only 
around $0.011.55 Equally important, the FCC found that consumers 
benefited from the intense nonprice rivalry among carriers, including “1) 
network upgrades; 2) product information and perception, which include 
advertising and marketing; and 3) downstream product differentiation, 
which includes handset/device and application offerings.”56 According to 
the FCC’s analysis, therefore, the higher concentration naturally resulting 
from mergers in the mobile sector has not diminished market 
performance.57   
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at para. 51. Significantly, unlike the analysis to support its decision to remove 
spectrum caps, the FCC in the Fourteenth CMRS Report specifically refused to count 
MVNOs as a competitor in the mobile wireless market in its analysis of market structure. 
See id. at para. 32 (“MVNOs are not counted as separate competitors from their hosting 
facilities-based providers in our analysis of market structure.”). The Fourteenth CMRS 
Report also reports an HHI of 2220, which is computed by the investment firm Merrill 
Lynch. See id. at Table 41.   
 51. Id. at para. 55 (This was “due to the complexities of estimating market power in an 
industry with high fixed costs that are recovered gradually over time, difficulties with 
analyzing pricing plans for bundles of services, and the difficulties in obtaining accurate and 
suitable cost data.”). 
 52. Id. at para. 155. 
 53. Id. at paras. 86–103. There are some who like to point to the OECD’s 2009 
analysis, which purports to show that the United States had among the highest mobile rates 
in the world, but the OECD’s analysis has been soundly discredited on its technical merits 
and should be given no probative value. George S. Ford,  
Be Careful What You Ask for: A Comment on the OECD’s Mobile Price Metrics, PHOENIX 
CENTER PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.phoenix-
center.org/perspectives/Perspective09-03Final.pdf. 
 54. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 190. 
 55. Id. at para. 192. 
 56. Id. at para. 104; see id. at paras. 104–52. 
 57. Of course, the mere mention of a rising HHI led some to conclude there was a 
competitive problem. For example, in the approving statement of FCC Commissioner 
Michael Copps to the Fourteenth CMRS Report, the Commissioner opined that  
the Report confirms something I have been warning about for years—that 
competition has been dramatically eroded and is seriously endangered by 
continuing consolidation and concentration in our wireless markets. One number 
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Nonetheless, the FCC’s enlightened economic analysis of 
concentration and performance is inconsistently applied. In its recent 
Phoenix Forbearance Order, for example, the FCC directly links 
concentration to market power in the most stringent of manners.58 Even in 
the mobile sector, the FCC appears often to be of two minds. Despite 
providing significant evidence of good market performance in the 
Fourteenth CMRS Report and rejecting market shares as a per se indicator 
of market power, the FCC recently revealed its interest in spectrum 
limitations by promulgating a rule limiting access to secondary-market 
spectrum by the largest mobile carriers—a de facto spectrum cap—in its 
Harbinger decision.59   
There, Harbinger Capital Partners sought to acquire Mobile Satellite 
Service (“MSS”) provider SkyTerra.60 Although the respective chiefs of the 
International Bureau, the Wireless Bureau, and the Office of Engineering 
and Technology raised serious concerns about the merged entity’s potential 
dominance of the MSS market (including a finding that Harbinger had 
ownership positions in MSS competitor TerreStar, along with a variety of 
                                                                                                                 
sticks out like a sore thumb: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index—a widely-
recognized and highly-credible measurement of industry concentration—shows 
that the concentration of mobile wireless service providers has skyrocketed to a 
weighted average of 2848.   
Id. at 11703. Commissioner Copps ignores the fact that the Report explicitly rejects this 
direct linkage between concentration and competition (“market concentration, by itself, is an 
imperfect indicator of market power”) and its conclusions regarding good market 
performance. Id. at para. 55. The media also focused on the industry concentration statistics. 
See, e.g., Todd Shields, FCC Says Wireless Concentration Rises; AT&T Disagrees, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 20, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-
20/fcc-says-wireless-concentration-rises-at-t-disagrees-update1-.html; Tracy Ford, FCC 
Finds Wireless Sector “Concentrated,” RCR WIRELESS (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.rcrwireless.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100520/FCC_WIRELESS_REG
ULATIONS/100529993/fcc-finds-wireless-sector-. 
 58. Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phx., 
Ariz. Metro. Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 8622 (2010) 
(the FCC drew conclusions of market power based primarily on market share). For a critical 
review of the FCC’s approach, see George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impossible 
Dream: Forbearance After the Phoenix Order, PHOENIX CENTER PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 16, 
2010, http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-08Final.pdf. 
 59. Schizophrenia is not limited to the present FCC. Despite declaring the mobile 
market effectively competitive in 2006, the FCC, under the leadership of Kevin Martin, 
imposed open platform mandates to the C-Block of the 700 MHz auction. Compare 
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Eleventh Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10947 (2006) (declaring the market effectively competitive), 
with Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and 
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 15289, paras. 189–230 (2007) (imposing open platform mandates). 
 60. SkyTerra Comm., Inc. & Harbinger Capital Partners Funds, Applications for 
Consent to Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 
25 F.C.C.R. 3059 (2010) [hereinafter Harbinger Order]. 
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other wireless competitors), what tipped the bureau chiefs’ hands was their 
acceptance of the merged entity’s promise to build a “4G” terrestrial (as 
opposed to satellite) wireless network that will provide coverage in the 
United States to at least 100 million people by December 31, 2012, at least 
145 million people by December 31, 2013, and at least 260 million people 
by December 31, 2015.61 While one can certainly see the appeal of 
Harbinger’s offer, the bureau chiefs went one step further by adopting a de 
facto spectrum cap without an opportunity for public notice and 
comment.62 
In particular, Harbinger first promised that, should it “seek to make 
spectrum available to either of the two largest terrestrial providers of 
CMRS and broadband services,”63 the merged entity would need to obtain 
FCC approval.64 Second, the merged entity would be required to live up to 
the buildout schedule proposed in the order.65 Finally, the merged entity 
would first obtain FCC approval before allowing traffic to the two largest 
terrestrial providers’ accounts to amount to more than twenty-five percent 
of SkyTerra’s total traffic on its terrestrial network in any Economic 
Area.66 These “voluntary commitments” have no apparent connection to 
any specific anticompetitive harm revealed by the bureau chiefs’ 
competitive analysis. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret this de facto 
“spectrum cap”67 as revealing a renewed interest in using regulation to 
modify market structure in mobile communications by limiting access to 
spectrum resources by some or all incumbent firms. For this reason (among 
others), we believe our analysis is timely and potentially helpful in the 
formulation of spectrum policy. 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at para. 56.  
 62. Indeed, contrary to this Administration’s promise of “transparency”—although the 
ex parte filings containing voluntary commitments were made on March 26, 2010—the FCC 
did not post these ex parte filings on EDOCS until March 29—three days after the order 
was released on delegated authority. See Letter from Henry Goldberg, Attorney, Goldberg, 
Godles, Wiener & Wright, to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC Secretary, Applications of Harbinger 
Capital Partners Funds and SkyTerra Communications, Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control 
of Licenses and Authorizations, FCC IB Docket No. 08-184 (rel. Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020397552. Thus, it was impossible by 
administrative fiat for the public to have an opportunity to comment on Harbinger’s 
“voluntary commitment” to a de facto spectrum cap.  
 63. Harbinger Order, supra note 60, at para. 72. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. The Harbinger Order is plainly a backdoor attempt to regulate indirectly by 
adjudication rather than by industry-wide rulemakings. See, e.g., Thomas M. Koutsky & 
Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC Merger Reviews: A Basic 
Legal Primer of the “Public Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 329 (2010). 
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III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Economic theory, and antitrust policy in general, are firmly and 
rightly geared toward encouraging entry by new firms in most situations. 
Although economics has identified a number of cases in which entry may 
not be socially optimal (e.g., cases of extreme scale economies or “natural 
monopoly”), there is a recognizable bias towards encouraging entry in most 
discussions of public policy.68 This pro-entry orientation is easily discerned 
in any examination of the history of U.S. telecommunications regulation, 
with leading examples including the unbundling regulations of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, rules against discriminatory pricing and 
mandates for interconnection, and auction rules intended to increase the 
likelihood of spectrum license awards to new entrants.  
Although this bias towards entry is understandable, it is important to 
recognize that economic theory also has established that the social benefits 
of entry, while potentially very large in the cases of monopoly and highly 
concentrated markets, can diminish fairly rapidly as more firms enter.69 
This “drop-off” in the impact of entry depends, of course, on the nature of 
market competition, the costs of entry, and the probable alternative path 
competition would take should entry not occur. For example, the model 
exhibiting the greatest effect of entry is surely the Bertrand duopoly with 
identical firms and products, in which the entry of a single additional firm 
converts industry performance from monopolistic to perfectly 
competitive.70 In this framework, entry by any additional firms has no 
social return. At the other end of the spectrum, a cartelized industry that 
adopted an entrant into its collusive structure would exhibit no social 
benefit from entry, regardless of the number of entrants considered. In 
more realistic intermediate cases, of course, entry will reduce prices, 
although at a diminishing rate as entry proceeds. The Cournot model of 
competition is the standard for intermediate cases, and the logic of this 
model lies at the heart of most public policy arguments favoring entry. 
                                                                                                                 
 68. There are limitations on the number of firms that can serve a market. This economic 
reality does not disqualify the entry-preference, but merely tempers it. See Competition After 
Unbundling, supra note 22. 
 69. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 218–21 (1988); 
John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979); Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22.   
 70. Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 346–47.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the number of firms and 
prices under alternative assumptions about the nature of competition.71 In 
the figure, price is measured on the vertical axis and the number of firms N 
(or 1/HHI) is measured on the horizontal axis.72 The monopoly price is 
labeled pM and marginal cost is labeled c. First, consider the relationship 
between the number of firms and price under Cournot competition. As 
shown by the line labeled “Cournot,” as the number of firms increases, the 
price gradually falls toward marginal cost (that is, the perfectly competitive 
outcome). Note that while price continually falls with increases in N under 
Cournot competition, most of the price cuts from competition are realized 
with the first few firms. In contrast to this steady decline in prices under 
Cournot competition, with Bertrand competition, marginal cost pricing is 
obtained with only two firms (i.e., duopoly).73 The line labeled “Bertrand” 
                                                                                                                 
 71. The figure was adapted from John Sutton. SUTTON, supra note 29, at 34. 
 72. If firms are identical, then HHI = 1/N. If there are two equally sized firms, then the 
market shares are fifty percent and the HHI is 0.50. With three firms, the shares are thirty-
three percent and the HHI is 0.33. 
 73. This intense competition creates an interesting predication called the Bertrand 
Paradox. If there are fixed costs, then the marginal cost pricing outcome with two firms 
ensures both firms earn negative profits. Thus, entry does not occur. Put simply, competition 
is so intense that it never happens. The Bertrand Paradox is highly relevant for public policy 
analysis in telecommunications markets, and we have incorporated the idea in earlier works, 
including Jerry B. Duvall & George S. Ford, Changing Industry Structure: The Economics 
of Entry and Price Competition, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER NO. 10, Apr. 2001, 
http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP10Final.pdf, reprinted in 7 TELECOMM. & SPACE 
L.J. 11 (2001); Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22; George S. Ford et al., Network 
Neutrality and Industry Structure, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER NO. 24, Apr. 2006, 
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reveals this sharp decline in price from pM to c between the first and second 
firm. As just mentioned, after the second entrant, additional firms have no 
effect on price, so the HHI and other measures of concentration are 
meaningless in the Bertrand framework. Finally, there is a line labeled 
“Collusion.” If firms are able to collude perfectly, then the price is held at 
the monopoly price regardless of the number of firms. As with Bertrand, 
the number of firms tells us almost nothing about price. Clearly, it is 
Cournot Competition that is consistent with the common view that more 
firms implies “more competition” in the form of lower prices. The failure 
to see prices rise as concentration rises in the mobile sector (see Figure 2), 
however, suggests that price competition may actually be more intense than 
Cournot Competition.74 
Thus, in any particular circumstance, it is vital to evaluate the likely 
effects of entry in light of both the observed industry structure and the 
probable alternative path competition could take if some form of entry were 
prohibited. These considerations are particularly relevant to the evaluation 
of the FCC policy of the “spectrum cap” (or favoritism in the auction 
rules), which is, in effect, a prohibition on entry by a class of credible 
incumbents. If one assumes, as seems correct, that the FCC policy is 
effective in the sense that it changes the outcome of the spectrum auction 
by altering which firm (or firms) obtain the desired spectrum license, then 
it is necessary to evaluate the outcome that the policy produces in 
comparison with the outcome obtained in the absence of the policy. Thus, 
if the practical effect of an incumbent-exclusion rule is to keep some firm, 
Firm 1 say, from obtaining the spectrum, then one needs to examine both 
what Firm 1 would have done with it, had it been allowed to win, and what 
the ultimate winner will do with it. It would then be possible to compare 
the welfare consequences of these two cases and make a credible judgment 
on the social welfare consequences of the prohibition.   
The welfare comparison described above is not simple, but a simple 
model can form the conceptual basis for the comparison. This is our 
purpose in this section. We begin by noting that, looked at broadly, an 
incumbent-exclusion policy (such as spectrum caps), if it makes sense, is 
actually a prohibition on entry imposed on a subset of firms that already 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP24Final.pdf, reprinted as T. Randolph Beard et 
al., Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2007). 
 74. Some economic models allow the intensity of competition to vary continuously 
from Bertrand to Perfect Collusion. See, e.g., MICHAEL WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
THE INDUSTRY 17–36 (1984); MARTIN, supra note 14, at 13–45. The effects of the intensity 
of competition on market structure is detailed in Competition After Unbundling, supra note 
22. 
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own related assets. Further, for the policy to make any difference, it is 
necessary that these prohibited firms be likely actually to win the spectrum 
in the absence of the policy, or else the policy is meaningless. The 
relevance of the policy, in turn, suggests that the analyst should assume that 
the profits available to the prohibited firm from acquiring the spectrum 
must exceed those a favored entrant could obtain, or else the banned entrant 
would not win the auction anyway. Thus, for the incumbent-exclusion 
policy to make sense from the social perspective, it must be that entry by 
the favored entrant creates welfare gains—for example, by lowering market 
prices, which are sufficient to overcome the fact that the banned entrant 
(e.g., an incumbent) values the spectrum asset more than anyone else.  
This logic appears to underlie the FCC’s spectrum cap policy and 
other regulatory handicaps placed on incumbent firms. In other words, by 
prohibiting a large incumbent from winning the spectrum at auction, the 
FCC expects another firm to use the spectrum to support entry into wireless 
voice communications and related services, thus increasing competition in 
these markets.  
What use, though, should one assume the unwelcome bidder would 
make of the spectrum had it been allowed to buy the spectrum? Here, some 
speculation is necessary, yet it appears highly likely that this asset would 
not be used merely to provide greater quantities of the same voice 
communication products currently offered by the firm over other 
frequencies. Rather, discussions in the business press and elsewhere75 point 
to the introduction of broadband/information-type services, which are 
regarded as complements to existing wireless voice-grade products, and 
would probably be sold together with them in packages.76  
In contrast to this “complementary entry,” if the incumbent-exclusion 
rule effectively caused a “new” entrant to join existing wireless firms in 
offering a standard product in competition to the offerings of the 
incumbents, then one would expect to see the equilibrium price of this 
standard offering fall in response to competitive entry. As outlined earlier, 
though, the extent of this price reduction would depend on the current 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See, e.g., NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5; Nicholas 
Kolakowski, CTIA Keynotes Focus on Spectrum Crunch, Broadband Future, EWEEK.COM 
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/CTIA-Keynotes-Focus-
on-Spectrum-Crunch-Broadband-Future-533219/; Stacey Higginbotham, Mobile Milestone: 
Data Surpasses Voice Traffic, GIGAOM (Mar. 24, 2010), 
http://gigaom.com/2010/03/24/mobile-milestone-data-surpasses-voice-traffic/. 
 76. In the United States, mobile broadband services are typically sold with mobile voice 
services. See, e.g., AT&T, www.att.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2011); VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011); Welcome to 
Sprint, SPRINT, www.sprint.com/index_p.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011). 
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market structure and the nature of competition in the market—for example, 
Cournot or Bertrand competition. In the past, the prevalent structure in 
many mobile markets in the United States was a duopoly, but that has of 
course changed substantially in recent years, and most customers now 
enjoy multiple vendor options for these services.77 
A.  Theoretical Model 
In order to make our analysis both general and simple, we proceed as 
follows. First, the standard voice market can be described as a Cournot 
oligopoly, with n firms selling identical products at identical marginal 
costs, which we normalize to zero. We identify Firm 1 as the seller 
prohibited by the auction rules from acquiring a newly available spectrum 
asset (which we term an incumbent-exclusion rule). In the absence of the 
incumbent-exclusion rule, Firm 1 would win the bid for the spectrum, and 
would use it to offer a complementary good that would benefit its voice 
service customers, conveying a competitive advantage. In the interest of 
simplicity and to render conservative results, we assume that Firm 1 can 
make no profits whatsoever from the sale of this complementary good 
except through the effects of its sale on the demand for its voice product. 
All consumer surplus and seller profits from this complementary good are 
ignored, so that our analysis will not be biased towards any finding that the 
incumbent-exclusion rule is socially wasteful.78 In our analysis, Firm 1 
would win the bidding for the spectrum asset in the absence of the rule, and 
would use the spectrum differently than the bidder winning the asset under 
the exclusion rule. Further, the firm winning the asset under the incumbent-
exclusion rule will dutifully enter the voice services market, increasing 
competition and reducing prices.  
Suppose first that there was no incumbent-exclusion rule. In that case, 
let the prices earned by the firms be given by the simple price equations: 
,)(1 QaP   (1) 
QaPi       for i = 2, 3, … n (2) 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844, para. 4 (1995).  
 78. If one took into account the surpluses potentially rising from the complementary 
good, then the spectrum cap would not only prohibit incumbent purchase of the spectrum, 
but would also prohibit the introduction of a “new” product. Under our assumptions, this 
new product may be introduced by anyone, but since it is not profitable by itself, only a firm 
with existing voice services would introduce it. Thus, in order to capture this effect without 
biasing the findings, we assume no direct profits from the sale of the complement.   
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where Q = q1 + q2 + . . . + qn and where a and  are positive known 
constants. Here the parameter a represents market size and  represents the 
additional value created for customers of Firm 1 due to creation of the 
complementary product.79 We note also that, under the incumbent-
exclusion rule, Equations (1) and (2) continue to describe the market if one 
takes  = 0, and lets n rise to n + 1. Recall that all prices are net of 
marginal costs.  
In the absence of the exclusion rule, we assume a Noncooperative 
Nash Equilibrium in quantities of the usual Cournot sort. First order 
conditions for this solution are: 
01  qQa      (3) 
for Firm 1 and 
0 iqQa      for i = 2, 3, . . . n. (4) 
Under symmetry for firms 2, 3, . . . n, the solutions are: 
)1/()(  naqi      for i = 2, 3, . . . n,  (5) 
)1/()(1  nnaq      (6) 
which satisfy the second order conditions and are unique so long as  < a. 
Calculating market output in the equilibrium, we obtain: 
,
1
1
1





n
a
n
nQ       (7) 
so that market output Q is increasing in . This result implies that the 
common price for Firms 2 through n, denoted Pi, falls as  increases. Thus, 
the introduction of the competitive advantage to Firm 1 causes its rivals’ 
prices to fall, in the same way that a decrease in the costs of a given firm 
will cause other firms to price more competitively in response. As for P1, 
the advantage  causes P1 to rise, but less than the increase in consumer 
value created by the complementary good. Since P1 = Pi + , the 
equilibrium response is: 
                                                                                                                 
 79. The value a shifts the market demand curve, whereas  is a shift in demand only for 
Firm 1. 
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Given these responses, it is clear that the social welfare consequences of 
the incumbent-exclusion rule will depend on a comparison of the benefits 
of the complementary good and resulting competitive effects, versus the 
benefits of increased competition through conventional entry into the 
standard good market.  
In our assessment of the welfare effects of an exclusion rule, we start 
by “stacking the deck” against the finding that the incumbent-exclusion 
rule is bad policy by focusing on consumer welfare only. This biases the 
analysis because firms are always harmed with entry in a Cournot 
framework. To begin, we ignore this effect on firms, thus inflating the 
welfare consequences of an incumbent-exclusion rule. The simple linear 
form of demands and normalized marginal costs imply that consumer 
surplus with entry by Firm 1 with the complementary good is just: 
.
2
1),( 2QnCW   (9) 
Similarly, with the incumbent-exclusion rule, consumer surplus can be 
suggestively written as CW(n + 1, 0), and simple algebra establishes that 
CW(n, ) > CW(n + 1, 0) if and only if: 
.
2
1



na
 (10) 
Condition (10) is elegant and highly suggestive: as an approximation, the 
incumbent-exclusion rule actually reduces consumer welfare, ignoring any 
benefits or costs to firms and benefits from the complementary market 
itself, whenever the effect of the complement on the value of the standard 
good, as a percentage of willingness to pay for the standard good, exceeds 
the statistic 1/(n + 2). Put another way, it is clear that society would prefer 
introduction of the complementary good over further entry into the 
standard good market when either (1) the complement is sufficiently value-
creating (a large ), or (2) the existing market is already sufficiently 
competitive (a large n, or intense rivalry).  
B.  Illustrations of the Theory 
Simple graphs are sufficient to illustrate the basic logic of these 
findings in both the consumer-only and consumer-plus-producer surplus 
cases. Consider Figure 2 below. Here, we normalize a to be equal to 1, so 
that one can view the vertical axis representation of . The shaded region 
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above the curve illustrates the set of parameter values for which consumers 
would be better served by abandoning the entry prohibitions embodied in 
the incumbent-exclusion rule. The curve has negative slope because the 
value created by the complementary good in the standard market need not 
be as large when the standard good market is sufficiently competitive to 
begin with. The logic is important. The larger the number of firms in the 
market (that is, the more competitive the existing market), the more likely 
an incumbent-exclusion rule is bad policy. So, while the spectrum caps (a 
form of an incumbent-exclusion rule) that applied early in the evolution of 
mobile services may have made sense given the duopoly structure of the 
market, in the present environment, when nearly every consumer has a 
choice among four providers,80 the incumbent-exclusion rule is not as 
easily supportable on welfare grounds. Further, historically, the potential 
for important innovative services was much lower than today, given the 
evolution of wireless broadband services. 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 provides the same analysis when total social 
welfare is used (consumer-plus-producer surplus). Note that we have 
significantly rescaled the vertical axis. As explained above, including both 
consumer and producer surplus greatly tilts the analysis towards a finding 
of welfare harm from the incumbent-exclusion rule as modeled here, but 
only because the consumer welfare standard alone is biased. This 
difference arises because in Cournot competition (and all “intermediate” 
models of competition), entry reduces prices, albeit at a decreasing rate. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 44. 
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Low prices reduce aggregate firm profits (i.e., a component of producer 
surplus). By forcing entry to take a form that reduces the profits of all 
incumbent firms, the incumbent-exclusion policy is unlikely to increase 
social welfare unless it provides very significant benefits to consumers 
through the competition-price reduction effect. However, that effect is not 
very large in Cournot and similar models beyond a few firms.  
These figures highlight several features of the incumbent-exclusion 
policy debate, which have been given too little weight in previous 
discussions—perhaps because concentration was much higher historically 
and no services were contemplated other than voice service. As is always 
the case, the social value of a policy cannot be determined unless one 
compares the likely outcomes with and without the policy. Given the 
present high levels of competition in the domestic mobile market, it is 
unlikely that additional entry will lead to substantial competitive price 
effects. The CRMS Reports and the FCC merger approvals consistently 
indicate that the FCC believes there is no meaningful relationship between 
concentration and market performance under current market conditions.81 
The price gains from more entry, then, are expected to be small or absent 
altogether. Alternately, the benefits of expanding spectrum assets for the 
purpose of providing broadband services are presumed to be high. The 
policy bias, it seems, should be in favor of more spectrum in the hands of 
                                                                                                                 
 81. In some instances, divestitures of spectrum assets are required in mergers and 
acquisitions. Such regulation actions are specifically intended to alleviate market power 
concerns. See Chloe Albanesius, DOJ Approves Verizon-Alltel, but with Big Caveats, 
PCMAG.COM (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2333728,00.asp. 
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existing firms. Further evidence in this regard is provided in the next 
section. 
IV. “MORE” SPECTRUM DOES NOT A FORTIORI MEAN “MORE” 
FIRMS 
The notion that more spectrum leads to more firms, or that 
incumbent-exclusion rules lead to more firms, is based on the presumption 
that the only factor limiting the number of firms is the amount of or access 
to spectrum resources. This view ignores the substantial capital investments 
and expenses required to build, maintain, and operate a mobile network. 
Moreover, it ignores the complexities and realities of managing a large 
customer base, and the interdependencies in demand and cost across the 
range of products offered over such networks. Put simply, dividing a chunk 
of spectrum into ten pieces does not imply that ten firms are financially 
viable. It is the supply- and demand-side conditions of the market, of which 
spectrum resources are but a part, that determine the equilibrium number of 
firms.82 In the above analysis, we assumed that the spectrum leads to 
greater numbers of financially viable firms, so as to give the incumbent-
exclusion policy the most favorable theoretical treatment. Economics and 
history, however, suggest otherwise.   
A.  Theoretical Evidence 
The prior analysis looks at the tradeoff between additional entry-
based competition and the utility derived from the creation of a 
complementary good. This analysis assumed that entry and exit into the 
standard market was costless. In reality, there are likely to be substantial 
fixed costs associated with entry by a new firm into the 
telecommunications marketplace. The presence of fixed costs allows a 
long-run characterization of the number of firms likely to be present in the 
market. Entry and exit are assumed to occur until economic profits are 
driven to zero.    
The profit level of a firm producing the standard good will be a 
comparison of its net revenue (net price times quantity) and the level of 
fixed costs. We will denote the fixed costs by the symbol F. Combining 
equations (7) and (2) yields the (net) price level of the standard good and 
equation (5) provides a characterization of the quantity. Setting the profit 
level of the standard good equal to zero will provide a characterization of 
the long-run number of firms present in the standard market. The number 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 335, 341–59; First Report, supra 
note 23, at paras. 377–83. 
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of long-run firms, nLR, will solve the following equation:    
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If the number of firms is treated as a continuous variable, then the impact 
of the sale of new spectrum on one of the existing firms (for the creation of 
a complementary good) can be characterized by: 
Fd
nd LR 1 
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 (12) 
The long-run loss to competition in the standard market could 
therefore be quite low if there are relatively large fixed costs associated 
with entry into the standard market. (In reality, the fixed costs are very 
large, limiting the number of successful firms to a small number.83) 
Furthermore, the loss of competition might even be zero due to the fact that 
the number of firms is, in reality, a discrete value. The amount of new 
spectrum may be insufficient to actually support an additional firm in the 
standard marketplace due to the fixed costs. In such a case, making the new 
spectrum available to an existing firm would generate welfare gain via the 
development of a complement without any long-run loss of competition in 
the standard market. In other words, there may not be a tradeoff between 
more quality or more firms, since the number of firms that can viably serve 
the market may be insensitive to spectrum policy due to the underlying 
supply- and demand-side economic conditions of the market. 
B.  The Historical Evidence 
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the market shares of the 
largest mobile telephony firms and the total MHz of spectrum made 
available by the FCC to such firms over the period from 1993 through 
2009. Total spectrum is shown by the shaded area in the figure and is rising 
over the entire time period. In 1993, there was 50 MHz of spectrum used 
for mobile telephony. Including all auctioned spectrum, this number rose to 
361 MHz by 2009.84  
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 61. 
 84. Auction data is available at FCC Auctions Data, FED. COMM. COMM’N, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_data (last visited Apr. 16, 2011). 
There are other calculations of available spectrum for commercial uses, but the sum of 
auctioned spectrum presented here is a sensible and unbiased one.   
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The Concentration Ratio, CRn, is used to measure industry 
concentration. The Concentration Ratio is computed as the sum of the n 
largest firms in the market. That is, CR2 measures the summed market 
shares of the two largest firms, and CR5 measures the market share of the 
five largest firms. Both the CR2 and the CR5 are illustrated in the above 
figure.85 Finally, the average revenue per minute for mobile telephony is 
provided. All data are computed at the national level. 
The figure shows clearly the following. First, the amount of spectrum 
has risen, yet industry concentration—as measured by the concentration 
ratio—has not declined. Thus, historical evidence does not support the 
notion that more spectrum means a lower level of industry concentration. 
Second, while concentration has risen over this interval, the price of mobile 
telephony has fallen consistently over the period.86 Therefore, historical 
evidence also does not support the notion that higher concentration leads to 
higher prices. The latter result has important implications for the theory. If 
                                                                                                                 
 85. The data is compiled from the FCC’s CMRS Reports (various years), which are 
available at Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Competition Reports, FED. COMM. 
COMM’N, http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=cmrs_reports (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).   
 86. Average revenue per minute data is compiled from the FCC’s CMRS Reports 
(various years). See id. The data are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index. 
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changes in concentration (or the number of firms) do not impact market 
performance, then the gains from an incumbent-exclusion rule are likely to 
be small and the net losses large. 
We note that these data cover many years, and technology has 
evolved over the years. As such, the trends in the figure are merely 
suggestive. Nevertheless, the historical data cannot be ignored and, if 
considered, it provides important insights for the economic value of 
incumbent-exclusion policies.   
V. CONCLUSIONS  
With the National Broadband Plan’s promise of 500 additional MHz 
of spectrum for commercial purposes, the question of how to allocate those 
resources among competing uses and users will dominate the 
communications policy debate over the coming years. The value of that 
spectrum depends critically on allocation choices. In this Article, we 
provide a policy-relevant, economically motivated framework to aid in 
such decisions, with a focus on incumbent-exclusion rules—including but 
not limited to formal spectrum caps. The analysis focuses on the efficacy of 
exclusion rules (or similar regulations limiting access by existing firms to 
new spectrum) for promoting economic welfare and maximizing the value 
of spectrum resources. At a basic level, the analysis describes the tradeoffs 
between dividing a fixed amount of spectrum into either many small pieces 
or a few big pieces. Since advanced services, such as mobile broadband, 
demand that each firm possess large amounts of spectrum, the relevant 
tradeoff is potentially between many firms selling less advanced services 
versus few firms selling more advanced services.   
Our analysis highlights several key components of the spectrum 
allocation decision. First, an incumbent-exclusion rule is not “pro-entry,” 
but instead seeks to select one form of entry (many low quality) over 
another (few high quality). Given the nature of the rule, the social value of 
an incumbent-exclusion rule cannot be determined unless one compares the 
likely outcomes with and without the policy, recognizing that the types of 
entry may vary across regimes. Second, given the existing level of 
competition in the domestic mobile market, the potential for sizeable 
competitive price effects is low. Third, given the high social value of 
broadband and the potential for mobile broadband to substitute for fixed-
line services, the economic benefits of advanced wireless services is likely 
to be very high. Fourth, access to spectrum resources does not necessarily 
convey financial success. Actual financial performance in the mobile sector 
suggests that the market is leaning to fewer rather than more competitors, 
so efforts to force more entry through spectrum policy are likely to fail, 
leaving scarce spectrum resources fallow. While more competition is 
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always enticing and public policy often plays a role in promoting 
competition, the FCC must be realistic in its expectations. 
The policy tradeoffs described here are theoretical and valid 
regardless of one’s predilections about spectrum policy. As we discuss, 
resolving the inherent ambiguity between more of one thing and less of 
another must turn on the evidence. We see it one way. Whether one adheres 
to our particular interpretation of the facts has no bearing on the usefulness 
of the theoretical framework presented here, however, and we hope it is 
helpful.   
 
